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Abstract There is currently a strong focus on
responsible research in relation to the development
of nanoscience and nanotechnology. This study
presents a series of conversations with nanoresearchers,
with the ‘European Commission recommendation on a
code of conduct for responsible nanosciences and
nanotechnologies research’ (EC-CoC) as its point of
departure. Six types of reactions to the document are
developed, illustrating the diversity existing within the
scientific community in responses towards this kind of
new approaches to governance. Three broad notions of
responsible nanoresearch are presented. The article
concludes by arguing that while the suggestion put
forward in the EC-CoC brings the concept of responsi-
ble nanoresearch a longway, one crucial element is to be
wanted, namely responsible nanoresearch as increased
awareness of moral choices.
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Introduction
Nanotechnology and the Attention to Governance
in Europe
This paper starts from an interest in responsible
research, and the recent focus on this in relation to the
development of nanoscience and nanotechnology
(nanoST). We are particularly interested in what
responsibility reallymeans in the context of an emerging
technology like nanoST. The introduction takes a closer
look at the notion of responsibility and we seek to
understand better how it has come to be so central in
debating the governance of nanotechnology. The
remaining parts of the paper focus on findings from
empirical work exploring the notion of responsible
nanoresearch in the context of governance. These
findings are then discussed against the concepts of
responsibility found in the theoretical and philosophical
work of Luigi Pellizzioni and Hannah Arendt.
Early and continuous funding to research into
ethical, legal and social aspects (with the acronym
‘ELSA’, or short form ‘-ethics’) has accompanied the
development of nanoST with the theme of governance
as one of the important topics from the beginning
[12]. This paper will focus on Europe, as by the time
the research for this paper took place (in 2008 and
2009), it was mainly here one could find attempts at
institutionalisation of ‘governance of (nano)science’.
A useful perspective on governance of science within
the European Union is that of the larger political
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challenges of constructing a common European
identity [14] and European citizenship [19]. In its
White Paper from 2001 [5], the European Commission
proposed ‘European Governance’ as the solution to
the paradox of the simultaneous public distrust in
the EU level institutions and the public demand for
global challenges to be approached above the
national level. Tallacchini [19] points to how “new
forms of normativity” (p.282), such as soft law have
become increasingly common in EU as a result of
“regulatory needs in the so-called knowledge society”
(p. 282), but that “its statute is unclear” (p.282). With
this, “nanotechnology has become a test case for a new
sort of governance. It is an opportunity to reimagine
the relationship between science and democracy.”.1
A timely question is whether governance should
facilitate smooth technological development, or
provide a way in which to put other values above
that of economic growth and progress? Or broader:
is governance still a good idea if it slows down
innovation? These kinds of questions have led to
several attempts to rethink the notion of responsibility in
relation to nanoST. This again, may be seen as a
willingness to look for alternatives to the standard
risk-benefit management regime and institutions
and practices inspired by neoclassical economic
theory. As stated about governance in the final
report of the EC funded project Risk Bridge, “[…]
there are inherent tensions between those three
functions of stimulating—controlling—facilitating
debate. Promoting innovation aims at realizing
potential benefits, but, as a driver for change, it is,
in the same time, a ‘creator’ of uncertainty, and thus
renders more and more difficult the tasks of
‘controlling’.” ([3], p 121). This tension exists in
public participation, which has been widely discussed in
fora such as the present journal, but becomes perhaps
even more crucial in another main strand of governance:
the integration of social scientists in natural science
research practises and communities, and the encourage-
ment of consideration for the societal aspects of research
within science itself. This has been looked into far less,
and is what will be the attention of the remainder of the
present paper.
Looking at policy and funding of research in EC, a
site of particular interest is the Unit L3 of Governance
and Ethics at the Directorate L—Science, Economy
and Society (under Directorate-General for Research)
(hereafter Unit L3). Through the program for ‘Science
in Society’ a number of research projects on the
governance and ethics of nanoST have been initiated.
The academic interest within ELSA research for
governance of science and technology, as well as the
need for the Commission to show that it looks at
governance [5], have been satisfied in relation to
nanoST, through an instrument for research interests
to be installed cross-thematically2 between different
lines of research (here ‘nanoST’ and ‘the testing of
approaches for governance’). Another major initiative
of the Unit L3 is the code of conduct for responsible
nanoresearch [6], which is the starting point for the
empirical part of this paper.
European Research and the Code of Conduct
for Responsible Nanoresearch
The publication in 2008 of a EC code of conduct for
nanoresearch [6], is one of the few concrete actions
into research by an authority that may be seen to be in
line with the academic discourse on broad and
inclusive governance and the ‘responsible development
of nanoST’. The document is entitled “European
Commission recommendation on a code of conduct for
responsible nanosciences and nanotechnologies re-
search” (EC-CoC). Interestingly, it does not provide
a definition of responsibility (as we shall see later;
this is quite common). Instead, it presents seven
principles, first briefly described and then used as
the foundation of a number of guidelines for action.
The seven principles are: Meaning, sustainability,
precaution, inclusiveness, excellence, innovation
and accountability. ‘Sustainability’, for instance, is
described as “N&N research activities should be
safe, ethical and contribute to sustainable development
serving the sustainability objectives of the Community
as well as contributing to theUnited Nations’Millennium
Development Goals. They should not harm or create a
biological, physical or moral threat to people, animals,
plants or the environment, at present or in the future.”
While ‘innovation’ is described as: “Governance of
N&N research activities should encourage maximum
creativity, flexibility and planning ability for inno-
vation and growth.” What appears to be implicitly
1 http://www.demos.co.uk/publications/nanodialogues, (last
accessed March 2010) 2 Personal communication René von Schomberg, March 2009.
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communicated is that adherence to these seven
principles indeed defines responsible nanoresearch.
Clues to what notion of responsibility the EC-CoC
builds on, and what kind of problem it seeks to solve
is perhaps to be found in another EC document, a
working document from 2007 [20]. Here, René von
Schomberg3 describes as the major ethical challenge
of today that “[s]cientists and engineers may even
claim that the possible applications and/or use are
not part of their role responsibility as scientists or
engineers.” (p. 10–11), or more generally, that there
exists “…an imbalance in the relation between the
individual’s responsibility for a particular and
temporal role and the collective responsibility which
is represented by the simultaneous fulfilment of great
number of roles for the long-term.” (p. 10). As a
solution “an ethics of collective co-responsibility”
(p. 11) is proposed. Public debate, transdisciplinary
deliberative technology assessment and foresight
activities, as well as the constitutional change
needed to implement these kinds of approaches are
described as part of the solution, as “the absence of
adequately deliberative forums is certainly one
reason why we are not yet able to democratically
plan our technological development. (p. 13)”. The
precautionary principle is presented as an example of
how “[t]he very implementation of such a principle
requires new and badly needed intermediate delibera-
tive science-policy structures (p. 13)”. The working
document concludes by using the example of
nanotechnology to illustrate how deliberative proce-
dures between the different political levels can be the
approach to answer the “crucial question […of] who
will decide, under which procedures, on what issue
and within what timeframe” (p.21). Especially
interesting in the context of this paper is the role that
the scientific community is envisioned in this example,
which is to “work with provisional voluntary guidelines
for research and applications, to allow for flexible
adaption to new developments. It is probably too
early for particular measures, yet, deliberation on
the quality and availability of scientific information
should be held on ongoing basis to enable to
monitor scientific and technological development.”
(p.23).
In the ‘responsible development of nanore-
search’, what is it that researchers and nanoST
stakeholders are responsible towards? According to
Tallacchini [19], “[t]hough all these new experimen-
tal practices sound promising, the regulatory reality
of emerging technologies appears quite traditional.”
(p.302), “[t]he idea of science endorsed by the EU
has not gone too far from the traditional image of
the scientific community (Polanyi 1962; Merton
1968).” (p. 291). For many, independent of the task
one performs as researcher, being a responsible
scientist is to develop new knowledge, be it basic,
applied, industrial or, as commonly seen for
nanoST, something in between these categories. In
Polanyi’s [18] classic treatise on the subject, respon-
sible science essentially is a commitment and love
for truth: “Yet, from time to time certain visions of
the truth, having made their appearance, continue to
gain strength both by further reflection and addi-
tional evidence. These are the claims which may be
accepted as final by the investigator and for which
he may assume public responsibility by communi-
cating them in print.” (p. 30). And it can only take
place if given freedom from direction from politics:
“The government of science […] exercises no
specific direction on the activities under its control.”
(p. 49). Commenting on the EC-CoC in the journal
of Nature Nanotechnology, Richard Jones ([11]; see
also [4]) writes that still “[m]any scientists believe in
a division of moral labour—they do the basic
research that, in the absence of direct application,
remains free of moral implications; technologists
and industrialists then take responsibility for the
consequences of applying that science, whether
those are positive or negative.”
Any new characterisation of researcher’s respon-
sibility challenges many established norms and
ideals for scientific practice to which scientific
practitioners are introduced through their education
and training. At the centre of these clashing visions
about responsible nanoresearch are the nanore-
searchers. They find themselves between traditional
ideals of science and new—and in part vaguely
articulated and competing—demands on the role as
researchers. Governance distributes responsibility
across the traditional walls between science, politics
and citizens. Allowing once again the widely used
metaphor of river streams, responsibilities for
unanticipated effects ‘downstream’ of research are
3 Von Schomberg is at the EC, DG Research, Unit L3 of
‘Governance and Ethics’ at the Directorate L, and has as such
had an active role in the development of the EC-CoC.
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now also distributed upstream (with the citizens of the
whole society) and midstream (with the scientists).
As such, the EC-CoC as a guideline for responsible
research does not enter into a vacuum, but into a
rather crowded space. The EC-CoC document is
placed in the midst of these tensions when over the
first 3 pages it is positioned among other EU
communications, action plans and activities. On the
one hand it links itself to the 2004 Communication
“Towards a European strategy for nanotechnology4”
and the 2005 “Nanotechnology Action Plan5”, which
identifies “actions aimed at creating the Community
added value necessary to remain competitive in this
sector while ensuring its responsible development”
([6], p. 2). On the other hand it is placed in the
tradition of the strategy on sustainable development6
“centred on objectives of environment and health
protection and poverty eradication.” ([6], p. 3).
On this background, the research and discussion in
this paper will be pursued along two broad lines: First,
the interest in how the nanoresearchers themselves
respond to the EC-CoC and what sort of reflections that
are triggered when governance enters the sphere of
professional responsibility and identity. Secondly, a
broader view is taken on how the reflections from the
nanoresearchers can be seen to support three different
answers to the question of what responsible nano-
research might be. The tensions described above,
between different visions for governance, inform both
of these lines of interest.
Method
The empirical research underlying this paper was
performed as part of a project where we have been
working as ELSA researcher associated with the
nanoscience initiative at the University of Bergen
(Norway).7 All the conversations with nanoresearchers
to be presented were conducted together with our
colleague, Fern Wickson, who also took part in
subsequent stages of discussion and analysis.
As follows from the above presentation ofmotivation
and theoretical perspective, in this study we have
wanted to take the inherent tensions in how the notion
of ‘responsible nanoresearch’ is in use in the EC as a
starting point for further reflections about what respon-
sible nanoresearch might mean. The EC-CoC provided
the apparently perfect case-study to develop our own
thinking around ‘responsible nanoresearch’ by under-
standing better how the EC-CoC is perceived by
nanoresearchers, and to test out our own theoretical
position with them. At the same time we wanted to
understand better what responsible nanoresearch looks
like from the point of view of those working with the
governance of science in the Europe Commission. As
ELSA-researchers, we often find ourselves providing
connections between the “world” of governance of
science and that of science itself. Hence, we have not
been interested only in the individual nanoresearchers,
but also in the research institutions and in tracing
responsibility between these two arenas in which it is
played out. The aim has been to challenge own ideas of
responsible nanoresearch from both these directions, as
well as searching for clues to how responsible nano-
research might be achieved.
The main part of the approach has consisted in
leading a series of conversations with nano-researchers
at our university in Bergen, about the EC-CoC. These
conversations form the core of the research. Secondly,
this was complimented by conversations with three
representatives from the EC; one nanoresearcher, one
employee of the Unit L3 and one social scientist
working with science policy. Talking with individuals
who hold positions in the EC, with different kinds of
relationships to the EC-CoC, contributed to deepen the
understanding of the EC-CoC and of the notion of
responsible nanoresearch from various points of view
within the European Commission. While observations
from the conversations with nanoresearchers in Bergen,
making up the core of the research for this paper, will be
presented under “Exploring the Nanoresearcher Role”
below, the conversations with representatives from the
EC mainly serve the purpose of adding that different
perspective in the succeeding discussion.
The series of conversations with nanoresearchers
were designed so as to cover the plurality existing
among the nanoresearchers at our own university. At
the time of the study, we had been working as
associated ELSA-researchers in the nanoresearch
community at the university for about 2–3 years. We
4 COM(2004) 338, 12.5.2004
5 COM(2005) 243, 7.6.2005
6 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eussd/, (last accessed March
2010)
7 The research was funded by the University of Bergen and the
Nanomat program of the Norwegian Research Council.
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therefore knew these researchers well from a number of
collaborations, teaching activities, seminars and formal
and informal meetings over the years, in relationships
characterized by mutual trust and respect. When we
approached them to ask if they would be willing to meet
us for a formal conversation about the EC-CoC, they all
agreed to make an appointment, and to prepare by
reading the EC-CoC document. Depending on the mode
of our previous contact with the researchers, we
approached them either as individuals or as groups. In
line with the aim to elicit the plurality of positions and
perspectives within the research community, it was an
advantage to talk to scientists in different settings, and to
talk to researchers in various stages of their scientific
career. In the following analysis we do not seek to
explore whether these different settings provided differ-
ent kinds of responses, but see them as contributing to
provide diversity. We spoke individually with three
senior researchers, attended a research-group (mix of
senior and junior researchers, ten in total) in their regular
weekly lab-meeting and met after work hours with a
group of 4 Phd-students. In terms of disciplines, the
researchers represent the fields of physics, chemistry
and molecular biology, all involved, however, in the
interdisciplinary nanoscience research platform. All of
the 17 researchers define themselves as working in basic
research or risk-research. Each of the conversations
lasted for about an hour, and we took extensive notes,
and in one instance the conversation was also recorded.
During the meeting, the researchers were left relatively
free to steer the conversations as they wanted. However,
a hard copy of the EC-CoC document was always there,
and we tried to tie the conversation directly to the
document and concretely to the text and formulations
within it whenever possible and reasonable.
The conversations where conducted over a period
of 9 months, from August 2008 to April 2009, and the
fact that they were spread out in time allowed us to
alternate between exploratory proximity and reflective
distance during the time of the study. We also, in
manner of conducting our ordinary tasks at the
university, met and collaborated with the conversa-
tional partners in other settings over the months that
the study took place. This dialectic approach, where
we varied between exploratory conversations on the
one hand, and individual reflection and discussion in
our research group on the other hand, proved fruitful.
One concrete effect of this open method approach was
that, early on in the research, it became evident to us
that it was our investigation that drew the attention of
the researchers to the EC-CoC for the first time.
Accordingly, we decided that our role as ELSA
researchers had to be thematised within the frames
of the study. Indeed, it led to reflections on the
implications of the proliferation of this kind of
researchers for nanoST in general part of the object
of investigation.
Findings from the Conversations
Exploring the Nanoresearcher Role
This section of the paper presents observations from
conversations with 17 nanoresearchers. Based upon
these conversations we suggest six “types” of
researchers, or perhaps ways that researchers present
themselves in discussion. The “types” are created
through simplifications and idealisations of their
responses to the EC-CoC, and lines of arguments
related to the understanding of the role as researcher
and of researchers’ responsibility. All the viewpoints
and positions presented below have their grounding in
the conversations, and all the main arguments we
came across are represented. Not any of the types
corresponds to one individual researcher in our
material, and not all of the types exclude each other.
Furthermore, especially in the conversations we had
with groups of researchers, different lines of arguments
shifted in dominating the conversation. The reasons for
presenting the material as types are twofold. First, the
wish to de-identify the conversational partners and
second, the way it allows showcasing the plurality of
perspectives without the full complexity of reality.
A first observation, however, was unanimous and
so straightforward that it just requires a plain
sentence: All the researchers described themselves as
responsible, and shared the view that researchers in
general are responsible. As the rest of this section will
show, however, we observed quite different views
about what this means in terms of what scientists are
responsible for, and who they are responsible towards.
The Excellent Nanoresearcher
“Excellent nanoresearchers” are characterised by a
self-image of scientific excellence and are very aware
that they and other senior scientists have worked hard
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to get where they are and that it takes decades to
develop the skills required to understand science at
the level they do. For them, this qualifies them to be
trusted by the members of society to do their best to
work in their best interest. It remains obvious to them
that scientists are the ones most qualified to make
decisions about priorities within research, and that
one cannot and should not attempt to steer science
towards short term goal. “Scientists are not treated as
they should by the politicians. They do not understand
what it is all about.8”. They strongly believe that the
skilled hard work and creative powers of scientists are
society’s best bet at getting out of challenges and
threats. Given resources and freedom, science will
most likely bring benefits, but since it ultimately is
about exploring the unknown there can be given no
guarantees. “Most science is for the waste-bin, […]
but the few percentages that turns out to be important
and useful is what brings progress and saves us all”.
In the mind of an excellent nanoresearcher the EC-
CoC threatens the very nature of basic research by
aiming to steer it towards objectives defined within
the short term frame of today’s political agenda. “This
document does not allow for science for the sake for
science, which we need in order for long term
breakthroughs”. Sustainability is among these short
term goals for them, with the idea that if all basic
research has to show that it will contribute to
sustainability, this inhibits and restrains the freedom
and creativity vital to development. Since “[a]s
humans we all want the same; a clean environment
and good health”, it is frustrating when innovative
research that may bring far-reaching progress in these
areas is slowed down by tedious political debate and
short-sightedness. An excellent nanoresearcher is
however also opposed to hard regulation of research,
and would not hesitate to come around this by for
instance inventing goals for projects in funding
applications to obtain financial support for what is
seen as important and interesting research. “I think it
may be useful to know [the structure of xxx], but not
why. For the funding bodies, I can think of reasons
for how this knowledge may be used, but the reason I
do it is because I find it appealing to find out”. The
excellent nanoresearchers’ response to the EC-CoC is
to prioritise the principle of freedom and to place that
above all the principles in the code. In this way they
circumvents the changes that the documents seems to
be aiming to enforce, and remain true to the
traditional ideals of science that they believe in and
under which they have succeeded in achieving their
positions.
The Subordinate Nanoresearcher
“Subordinate nanoresearchers” express an under-
standing of their own role as researcher as that of
performing the tasks entrusted to them by their
superiors in the research group and in the laboratory.
They do not express particular interest in issues
related to the social context of their work. “I have
never seen this [the EC-CoC] before. Should I have
been introduced to it? By whom?”. When presented
with the EC-CoC, they are in doubt about how to
respond because they see it as concerning issues that
are outside the scope of their role. They do not wish
to go along with the demand to reflect upon these
matters in conversation, pointing out that these kinds
of considerations belong elsewhere in the hierarchy.
“I do not know how it applies. The project is given to
me by my supervisor.” When subordinate nano-
researchers still agree to talk to us, it is mainly to
express these kinds of hesitations, and to suggest that
we speak to a senior colleague.
The Social-Democrat Nanoresearcher
Social-democrat nanoresearchers are interested in, and
articulated about, science policy and their own role as
researchers. Nevertheless, they struggle to properly
grasp what kind of a document the EC-CoC is. “The
objective with the document, as I see it, is partly to
pave the way for an ethics, maybe, for what is here
called stakeholders in nanoresearch, and to make that
clear both through these principles but also to
communicate to the public the restrictions that
science put upon itself.” They fully support the
sections encouraging more communication from
science to the broader community (“If you believe in
this thing with democracy—you have to let go a bit.
You have to allow for the public to have a say.”),
because they think it is important that the public get
better educated in matters of natural science in order
to be involved in deliberative democratic processes
for science and technological. “To some extent
8 The quotes in this section are direct quotations from the
conversations.
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communication would help, it could fix a lot if more
people understood the science involved.” To them,
many of the listed principles at first seem obvious and
vague, but in practical terms some of them seem to be
in conflict with each other. “What you have here is in
a way different sets of values, the generic with long
duration, and they are ok, but, in addition you have
those with a lot shorter duration, and these should
have been better grounded.” In this way, they point
out “[the document] consists of a number of detached
guidelines that are put together, but do not relate to
one another.” One example is the principles of
sustainability and innovation. These two principles,
as defined by the EC-CoC (see the Introduction to this
paper), put competing demands on the nanoresearchers,
who on the one hand should contribute to innovations
that can fuel the European economy, while on the other
hand make sure that their activities do not harm people
or the environment. The social democrat nanoresearch-
ers point out that it is not impossible to contribute to
growth without harming people, but that it is impossible
to guarantee that your contributions to innovation will
not create threats at present or in the future. They see the
lack of prioritisation between principles as problematic,
and as researchers they are clear about what must
be their main responsibility: “For me, it is obvious
that good laboratory practise and security for my
employees must have the highest priority”, except
from that, “If you have taken all reasonable measures
at the time, then that must be what can be required from
the researcher.” It is the responsibility of the
regulatory authorities to take an overall perspective
and carve out the main direction of the whole
scientific enterprise.
The Risk-Minded Nanoresearcher
Risk-minded nanoresearchers have a deep commit-
ment to what they see as a task of controlling that the
materials used in science and industry are safe. They
see this as an important job that someone has to do.
“We investigate the material [xxxx]. No one else is
investigating this, because it is said to be safe. They
were saying that we should look at something else,
because we would not get any interesting results, and
never get anything published.” It is crucial to their
identity and motivation that it is possible, given
enough time and resources, to control the risks
stemming from science. They welcome the EC-CoC
as recognition from the authorities in Europe of the
important work they are doing. “I am happy with this
document; it says that funding should go to projects
as far as the risk is also evaluated.” Still, they express
frustration about the lack of concrete measures and
formulations onto which to build action. They also
express that the document seems to be designed with
good intentions, but with little force behind it. If it
had been important, they believe, it would have come
with sanctions for not meeting the terms. They will
still refer to it when arguing for more funding and
more attention to risk-research, which they believe is
what is needed to satisfy the principles in the code.
The Uncertainty-Minded Nanoresearcher
Uncertainty-minded nanoresearchers work with risk-
research, but the overwhelming ignorance about
nanomaterials has led them to doubt that more
toxicology research alone can rule out entirely the
possibility of negative consequences. The vast need
for research about the behaviour of nanomaterials
makes them experience their job as extremely
important, but the suspicion that one can never obtain
certainty interferes with their motivation. “The results
vary so much! But because of lack of reference
materials and proper methods, it is hard to say what
are real results and what are the result of the method
we use. […] The problem now is that the methods for
testing are not reliable for nano. The more we added,
the less toxic [xxxx] got!” They welcome what they
see as recognition of the need for the kind of research
they are involved in from the EC in the code. But the
EC-CoC also resonates with their doubts, by encourag-
ing them to think about what it means to be a responsible
nanoresearcher. “You are accountable as long as you
do your research, follow the ethical rules, do the best
you can and are open about what you do, I think…”
The Ironic Nanoresearcher
Ironic nanoresearchers, as most of today’s senior
nanoresearchers, were originally trained within one of
the standard disciplines of physics, chemistry or
molecular biology. The re-interpretation of their
research-groups, research-activities and of themself
as ‘nano’ (while the work they do by far remains the
same) have been for administrative and political
reasons more than scientific ones. NanoST is priori-
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tised by the university, it attracts funding and it
creates attention to important research that has been
neglected far too long. They believe that crossing the
disciplines, there are strands of research that has the
potential that has come to be associated with nanoST,
but what they do is far from fulfilling these kinds of
expectations. “If you go deep, there is something
genuinely different about the nano-label […] they
invented a car at nanoscale that could move. It shows
that man now have the ability to make and manipu-
late things at this scale.” The ironic nanoresearchers
have taken on the nano-label without feeling entirely
comfortable with it, between them they joke about
how nanoST does not really exist, even if they are
nanoresearchers (hence the term ‘ironic’). Whenever
referring to themselves as ‘nanoresearchers’, they
make sure to also comment upon the political force
of this label and the hype that surrounds it. The EC-CoC
is a reminder that for some people; many scientists,
members of the public and politicians, being a
nanoresearcher distinguishes them from other
researchers and this creates uncertainty relating to
whether the label has unexpected strings attached.
“Actually, I have not seen anything in this document
so far that is nano-specific. Of course science should
‘meet the best standards’, but you have a lot of
different kinds of research.” Now they question
whether the bureaucrats in EC expect more in terms
of ethical considerations from nanoresearchers, or if
they believe that nanoresearchers are less ethically
aware or less responsible than other researchers. It
becomes of crucial importance to them to clarify the
definition of nanoscience, and the relevant criteria
for something to qualify as nanoresearch, before
even entering into a conversation about the EC-CoC.
They need to discuss the premises and justification
for the existence of a code of conduct for nanoresearch.
It has to be clarified whether there is seen to be
something special about ‘nano’ that warrants particular
attention in terms of ethics and responsibility. With an
ironic nano-identity, it becomes crucial to clarify that
there is nothing in what they do that deserve special
ethical attention.
* * *
In the conversations, we observed how the tensions
between old and new ideals of responsible research
play out in a number of different ways—simplified
through the responses described here. What we have
wanted to show above is that it is more complicated
than to say that ‘the old view of responsible research’ is
in tension with ‘the new view of responsible research’.
When confronted with a set of principles for responsible
nanoresearch, the nanoresearchers we spoke to
responded differently. While excellent nanoresearchers
for example fundamentally disagree with any blurring of
the border between science and politics, social democrat
nanoresearchers get frustrated, because to some extent
they agree but they do not see anymore how they can act
responsibly according to the internally conflicting
principles they are presented with.
Exploring the Role of Co-production
The research for this paper made 17 researchers read
the EC-CoC for the first time, several of whom found
the document well suited for teaching and said that
they intended to use it with their students. That the
document in this way is spread through the scientific
community and subjected to reflection, criticism and
debate is, according to the representative for the Unit
L3 that we spoke to, part of the intention. Through the
research, we became actors in the governance that we
set out to investigate, especially since none of the
researchers we approached had read the code and we
therefore introduced them to the document.
Several of the conversations started with interac-
tions with ‘ironic nanoresearchers’, about whether
nanoscience exists or not. At the time these exchanges
were experienced as quite frustrating for us. The
definition of nanoscience was not what we wanted to
talk about. We felt as though we had to take a step
back and spend large part of the session on what we
saw as a distraction from the issue at stake. In
reflecting upon this later, we understood that what
we assumed to be an acceptable and legitimate
premise for the conversations was partly what was
at stake for the nano-researchers. For us, the EC-CoC
represents an interesting example of an experiment
with a new approach to governance applied to the case
of nanotechnology. For our conversation partners,
however, whether or not the label of nanoresearcher
put them in a situation with new expectations and
demands was of urgent importance, especially as these
demands seemed quite obscure. We also found the
practical consequences of the EC-CoC relatively
unclear, but while for us this was precisely what was
interesting, for the nanoresearchers it was disturbing to
discover that the extent to which they did their job
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responsibly might be assessed according to criteria
that seemed poorly defined. Independent of possible
implications for practise, however, the idea that
bureaucrats with, in their mind, limited understanding of
science could create a code of conduct for nanoresearch
based upon a misunderstanding about the importance
and potential attached to this label was experienced as
distressing.
The nanoresearchers at our university expressed
appreciation for the opportunity to talk to us about
responsibility. “I am happy that you introduced me to
this [the EC-CoC], I think I should know it. It creates
awareness, in a sense. It is only when you meet other
researchers that you are able to see your own
limitations. It is very good that you approached us
with this.” The positive response has to be seen in
context of the longer term relation we have had with
these researchers and previous experiences with
discussion of similar issues, which is also part and
parcel of the broader push of governance. Even
though the researchers’ own views on what their
responsibility is did not necessarily correspond to the
theories and the thinking that has informed the
creation of the EC-CoC, our nanoresearch community
welcomed the opportunity to discuss these kinds of
issues. Many ELSA researchers (the authors of this
paper included) see their role as partly to create
awareness, reflection and debate in the public and in
the scientific community about societal issues related
to science and technology. The proliferation of this for
nanoST in Europe has succeeded in generating some
spaces and opportunities where researchers can relate
to the wider social aspects of their research, and at
least in our material, the opportunities may have
created a further demand. The willingness to enter
into these kinds of conversations may therefore be
seen as a success for a first step into governance: the
empowering of individual researchers by providing
training and resources for broader reflection. The
EC-CoC goes quite far in describing indirectly the
responsible nanoresearcher, but inherent in the
description is the mandate to participate in a debate
about what it is to be a responsible nanoresearcher.
This may lead to a kind of circularity in that it may
be said that a responsible nanoresearcher is someone
who takes an active part in debating the terms and
conditions of responsible nanoresearch. Paradoxically,
in our material, some nanoresearchers seem to enter into
the conversation precisely to defend the traditional
image of the scientific community—and by consequence
also the right not to debate the social and political
aspects of their research.
The observations from the conversations seem to
indicate two obstacles for the EC-CoC. The first is
that it is dependent upon distribution (through
national states, research councils, university adminis-
trations etc.), which in the case of the nanoresearch
community at our university seem to have failed. The
second is that it seems to have difficulties communicat-
ing its intension of being an invitation to communicate
back—precisely because it is a publication from EC.We
found a fundamental scepticism concerning what it is
that the code is trying to do. In all the conversations, the
permanency of the code’s content was taken for granted
by the scientists. Although the discussions often
revolved around what was perceived as weaknesses of
the document and ideas about how it could have been
improved, the researchers never raised the issue that it
could be changed. This shows that although welcoming
the opportunity to debate this kind of issues, and to some
extent feeling empowered to discuss it with us, they did
not see themselves in a role as to actively engage,
interact or participate in policy—or in fact see EC
documents as things that may actually be changed. The
deliberative aspect of the code and the fact that it will be
revised was highlighted in the conversation with the
representative from Unit L3, as well as underlined in the
text of the code itself, when it states that “the Member
States cooperate with the Commission in order to
review this recommendation every 2 years…” (p. 4)
and “…this Recommendation also be used as an
instrument to encourage dialogue at all governance
levels among policy makers, researchers, industry,
ethics committees, civil society organisations and
society at large…” (p 4). The nanoresearchers did not
see it as an invitation to participate, but rather as
coming from far away bureaucrats with a misunder-
stood, or at best vague, understanding of science, and
with unclear consequences for their practise. “I do not
think that it was the scientists that wanted this code. It
has come from above. The document is a first step
towards legislation. […] The code doesn’t really mean
anything. There is a lot of twisting going on.” This is
an ironic consequence of the lack of communication
that this document (from the point of view of the
Commission) may be partly a proposition to remedy.
One challenge is that it is exactly this involvement that
some nanoresearchers resist, because it counters their
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understanding of the role and responsibility they have
taken on as scientists.
* * *
Summing up, the main observations are: first of all
that all the nanoresearchers saw themselves as
responsible scientists. Second, that there existed a
variety of views on what responsible nanoresearch is
(here simplified into six types). Third, that it was we
who introduced the nanoresearchers to the code.
While they appreciated the opportunity to talk to us
about the issues raised in the EC-CoC, it existed
confusion about its status and meaning. Forth, that
none of the nanoresearchers took the EC-CoC as an
invitation to dialogue with the decision-makers.
Rather than feeling like partners in a process, they
expressed confusion and opposition towards new
demands on how to do their job, and some expressed
indignation that someone indicated, in their mind, that
they were not doing their job responsibly and
ethically sound.
Three Broad Notions of Responsible Nanoresearch
This paper pursues the issue of responsible nanoresearch
along two lines. So far, it has focused on an empirical
question, namely how nanoresearchers respond to the
EC-CoC and what sort of reflections that are triggered
when governance enters the sphere of professional
responsibility and identity. While maintaining the
perspective of the nanoresearcher, in the final part of
the paper we shall try to lift the gaze and discuss
responsible nanoresearch on a conceptual level, along
the line of three broad notions of responsible nano-
research. The first two notions exist as clearly articulated
and contrasting notions in the public and academic
debates about science and society of the last few
decades. These are also the crystallisation of the main
two positions drawn from what was presented above.
We shall argue, however, that the conversations also
allow for a third notion of responsible nanoresearch,
emphasising mindfulness and Hannah Arendt’s concept
of ‘thinking’—providing what we see as an important
and perhaps necessary supplement.
In spite of its growing centrality, the notion of
responsibility is often left unproblematised and
undefined in the policy documents, as pointed out
by among others Ferrari and Nordmann [7]. In our
view, Pellizzioni [17] provides a useful analytic
disentanglement of the notion of responsibility. He
suggests that it has taken on different emphasis at
different times in environmental policy—and with
governance it has shifted again. We find this sorting
out of the different meanings of responsibility is
valuable, and the analysis is presented here in a very
simplified version. Pellizzioni [17] points to four
ways that the notion of responsibility is used in the
context of environmental policy: Care, liability,
accountability and responsiveness. He traces their
appearance and emphasis through history. Until
around the 1960s, he writes, the idea of responsibility
was that of care, driven by ‘before the event’ motifs
and ‘in-order-to’ factors. The welfare state was
responsible in the sense that it knew what its citizens
needed and its ability to act accordingly was
unquestioned. Increasingly faced with incidents of
environmental damage, the emphasis of responsibility
(in early environment policies) shifted towards liability,
dominated by ‘after the event’ motifs and ‘in-order-to’
factors. It became more about legal instrument (such as
for example the polluter pays principle) to assign
responsibility for events that had already happened,
although the notion of responsibility as argued for from
within still prevailed. As awareness of growing social
complexity, accompanied by decline in legitimacy and
authority, increased, the emphasis in responsibility
shifted towards the dimension of accountability,
dominated by ‘after the event’ motifs and ‘because’
factors. This was dominated by the need to justify
choices and behaviour in retrospect vis à vis allegation
or questions coming from outside/society. Finally,
within a theoretical framework of scientific uncertainty
the focus of responsibility has tended to shift towards
that of responsiveness, dominated by ‘before the event’
motifs and ‘because’ factors. Responsibility has to do
with answerability to an outside demand to take action
in order to avoid situations of damage or harm, “a
willingness to understand and confront the other’s
commitment and concern with our own, to look for a
possible terrain of sharing. It entails readiness to
rethink our own problem definition, goals, strategies,
and identity.” ([17], p. 557). Despite the focus here on
the willingness to evaluate own goals and identity, it is
still a process initiated and motivated from outside.
These different ways to understand or put emphasis in
the notion of responsibility resonates with the tension
described above, which seems to stem from underlying
understandings of what it is that one sees oneself as
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ultimately responsible towards: performing the role
assigned to the professional in contributing to growth
and progress—or towards ‘something else’, like for
example the continuation of human life on earth [10],
taking part in the contemplative and active life that
constitutes the human condition [1] or being part of the
ecological community of beings [13]. We shall now
apply Pellizzoni’s analysis to the notions of responsi-
bility found (or indeed wanting) in our conversations
with the nanoresearchers.
Responsible Nanoresearch as the Traditional Social
Contract of Science
According to an excellent nanoresearcher’s line of
argument, responsible nanoresearch is, in addition to
follow formal safety regulations and show good
collegial behaviour, to practise within the traditional
social contract for science. This is a model that has
proved itself to work by giving society progress and
benefits based upon scientific knowledge, and hence
the most responsible thing to do is to change as little
as possible. Above all, academic freedom needs to be
protected, so that nanoresearch is allowed to explore
unconstrained by political steering. A risk-minded
nanoresearcher would agree, but emphasis the
importance of complementing all research with
robust risk-research. With sufficient money and
resources to research into potential adverse effects
to health and the environment, one will be able to
responsibly control new substances that are commer-
cialised based upon nanoresearch. This line of argument
in the scientific community, has support also in the EC
(see the Introduction and [3]), in the use of governance
as a way to insert more deliberation and openness
within the existing institutional framework. The role of
the EC-CoC in this respect is that the public can
acknowledge that science is concerned with issues
such as sustainability and precaution. It should not lead
to further institutional changes, but show that the
concerns in the public sphere are taken account of also
in the scientific community.
Going back to Pellizzioni’s [17] four different uses
of the notion of responsibility, this resembles
accountability, where responsibility is argued for
and defined in terms of the ability to justify
behaviour. Nanoresearchers main responsibility is
to perform research within the political and legal
framework provided, and within this framework be
able to make account and explain rationally its
choices in terms of a risk-benefit argument: the
reasonable amount of resources has been allocated
to risk-research; the expected benefits exceeded the
expected risk and so forth.
Responsible Nanoresearch as Deliberation Across
Levels and Sectors
The view described in the previous section is in
tension with views that see responsible nanoresearch
as moving in the direction of dissolving the institu-
tional separation between science and policy. This
means to go from a traditional Mertonian social
contract for science in which science and society are
strictly separated domains, to what has been termed a
new social contract for science, allowing “society to
speak back to science” [9, 15]. Above, this latter view
was presented by social democrat nanoresearchers
and it begins from the belief that science and politics,
facts and values to some extent are intermingled
anyhow. The notion of responsible nanoresearch,
then, has a very different starting point. As detailed
above, the idea that science and society are intimately
entangled often leads to arguments in favour of the
democratisation of science, through deliberation and
inclusion of citizens and stakeholder in scientific and
political decision-making. For the nanoresearcher, this
notion of responsibility means to acknowledge the
entanglement of science with society and to engage in
deliberation about the broader aspects of nanoresearch.
It is the profession of nanoresearch that has this
responsibility, and the social democrat nanoresearcher
would probably agree with the architects of the EC-CoC
that what is needed is to get in place functioning
institutions where this kind of deliberation and commu-
nication is encouraged and facilitated. The EC-CoC is,
of course, one attempt to move in this direction. It is
telling that the social democrat nanoresearchers, who in
principle agreed that they had a responsibility to be
engaged in social aspects of their work, articulated
deep scepticism towards the decision-making institu-
tions. In being willing to modify their own role, these
researchers needed to trust that the other actors involved
in the development of nanoresearch would take their
responsibilities accordingly. This requires institutions at
all levels that are prepared to take the consequences of
the insights that are gained from these kinds of
deliberations. The fact that different views on gover-
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nance exist side by side in the communications from the
EC may create hesitation about making changes in own
practise in the nanoresearcher communities, even
among those who in principle support many of the
changes proposed in governance.
One of the weaknesses of the EC-CoC as a
governance instrument seems to be that it does not
reach nanoresearchers and other stakeholders in
nanoresearch in the intended way. It fails to be
perceived as an invitation to dialogue. This may seem
banal, but it points to one of the challenges of
governance: the EC-CoC attempts to install engage-
ment, and to create democratisation, reflection and
deliberation, but being a Commission recommendation
it cannot escape the fact that it comes “from above”, to
the scientists from the authorities. In order for the
nanoresearchers to experience agency, there have to be
possibilities for them to communicate back into the
decision-making system, whether to the university
administration, national level authorities or to the
European Commission.9 The more fundamental
challenge is the paradoxical situation that when the
authorities instruct through directives citizens and
professional groups to get engaged, they may
achieve the precisely opposite effect. At least, in
order for a document like the EC-CoC to be a
platform for communication and deliberation, there
need to be in place practices for communication
within and across institutional levels. von Schomberg
[20] indeed included constitutional change as one of
the four needed changes to get to the co-responsibility
he proposes. This is, in difference from engagement,
one of the things that require political initiative. It is
however, far to go to install support and facilitation for
deliberation and communication in all levels of science
policy and administration. von Schomberg [21] points
out that “[t]he EC Code of Conduct also view Member
States of the European Union as responsible actors,
and invites them to use the Code as an instrument to
encourage dialogue […]” (p. 9). It was pointed out by
one of the EC nanoresearcher that certain member
states (such as Germany and the UK) in many ways
already are more progressive than what is called for by
the EC-CoC. The status of the European Union as a
collection of individual national states does however
provide a challenging institution in which to succeed
with governance. Conflicting ideas about science
policy, within the Commission and within and
between nations, makes thorough institutional reform
of governance approaches seem rather unlikely in the
short term.
Although poorly institutionalised, the practical
enactment of deliberation is one of the places
where the ELSA kind of researchers is already
making a contribution. Ethics courses, interdisci-
plinary seminars, formal and informal conversations
and research collaboration between the natural and
social sciences are all examples of small contributions in
this respect. In this way, reflexive capacity and
vocabulary may be built: ELSA-researchers learn more
about the daily practices and vision of nanoresearch, and
nanoresearchers learn more about the theories and
resources that exists for ethical and social appraisal of
science and technology.
Despite these practical challenges, this second
notion of responsible nanoresearch would entail that
if one managed to institutionalise deliberation between
sectors and levels, nanoresearch as a profession would
be responsible. As Pellizzioni [17] describes, the
conviction that scientific certainty is unattainable
(either ontologically or epistemologically) makes the
idea of responsibility as the ability to justify choices
rationally in retrospect, fall apart. The acknowledge-
ment of scientific uncertainty favours a notion of
responsibility that resembles that of responsiveness.
Nanoresearchers are responsible if they are willing to
enter into dialogue with and be confronted by the
beliefs and concerns of other actors, individuals and
stakeholders in the development of nanoresearch, and
rethink their work in accordance with such queries. In
this line of arguing, responsible nanoresearch is taking
seriously other actors as conversational partners and
co-producers of the nanofuture, funded on an
understanding that nanoresearch is one among
many relevant fields of knowledge, and the scientific
one among many possible framings of the development
of nanoST.
Responsible Nanoresearch as Increased Awareness
of Moral Choices
Institutionalisation of deliberation and communication
between levels and sectors in nanoresearch may have
a significant potential to prevent instances of envi-
ronmental, social, ethical and health-related harm
9 Norway, where this study was carried out, is not a member of
the EU but part of the European Research Area Network.
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from nanoST by revealing science/society entanglement
and scientific uncertainties. It may steer nanoST in a
more socially desirable and robust direction by broad
inclusion and negotiation of values in scientific
decisions. Even when scientific uncertainties and
plurality of values get exposed by deliberation and
communication, however, they pose fundamental
challenges for (personal and political) decision-making.
The awareness of this can be paralysing in closing down
decision processes, as it renders the fundamental
decision tool of rational weighing of benefits against
risks ineffective. The third notion of responsible
nanoresearch starts from the acknowledgement of
how this shortcoming ultimately leads to personal
moral judgement and choice.
In the conversations, two of the types came across
as unsettled and in a process of making sense of their
own personal roles within nanoresearch. The
uncertainty-minded nanoresearcher pointed to the in-
ability to understand the responses in risk-research for
nanoparticles, and had come to consider the possibility
that risk-research might be unable, temporarily or
permanently, to predict the behaviour and reactions of
nanoparticles even under the extremely simplified
conditions of the laboratory. Talking about this made
the uncertainty-minded nanoresearcher uneasy and
seemed to challenge her sense of whether being
involved in nanoparticle risk-research, at the end of the
day, made her feel responsible. Likewise, for ironic
nanoresearchers, the confrontation with the EC-CoC
made the label of nanoresearcher feel uncomfortable,
and led to reflections about the personal association and
involvement with the enterprise of nanoST. Deliberation
or conversation can lead to confrontation with own
values, which then has to be thought through and made
sense of at a personal level. The third notion of
responsibility involves cultivating one’s sensitivity for
recognising when personal moral judgements and
choices are being made in the midst of professional life.
This sensitivity may be generated through deliberation,
but is not identical with it. Likewise, in contrast to
deliberation such sensitivity does not necessarily aim to
assist political decision-making directly, but is a
resource for personal day to day decision-making. Not
being instrumental, it is rather a notion of responsibility
as a way of being.
One way to approach this notion of responsibility
may be along the lines of Hannah Arendt [2]. She
emphasises the need for each individual to think in
order to make moral judgements, and act responsible.
‘Thinking’, is used by Arendt here in the particular
meaning of inner dialogue, and her argument is that
individuals who regularly rehearse the practise of
thinking, in this sense, will find it increasingly
unbearable to act against their own convictions and
values. It involves questioning one’s own actions, in
light of own values. Thinking entails being alone with
oneself, providing a strong motivation for being able
to like oneself. It hence strengthens the ability and
motivation for making moral judgements, as well as
the mindfulness to when moral judgements are being
made. “The manifestation of the wind of thought is no
knowledge; it is the ability to tell right from wrong,
beautiful from ugly. And this indeed may prevent
catastrophes, at least for myself, in the rare moments
when the chips are down.” ([2], p 189). Although the
catastrophe Arendt had in mind was a quite different
one from those one may envision resulting from
nanoST, her emphasis on the individual inner
dialogue as a requirement for responsibility remains
convincing. As scientific uncertainty may paralyse
the rational balancing of benefits and risks, her
point is precisely that in lack of knowledge, or
even in lack of the skill or resources to pursue
knowledge, to remain thinking ensures the individual’s
personal ability to feel responsible. And the individual
sense of feeling able to perform its professional tasks
responsibly is crucial. Responsible nanoresearch in this
respect may be not to put away pertinent concerns raised
in own contemplation, in dialogue with peers or by other
stakeholders, even if not able to solve them, but to
remain committed to thinking through these kinds of
questions on a regular basis. In Arendt’s analysis,
however, thinking is (and should be) connected to
praxis, to action and the interaction with fellow
citizens. In this sense it does not replace the notions
of responsibility discussed above, but contributes with
another element to what it takes for the individual
nanoresearcher to feel responsible, even when she
takes into account that what she does is part of a larger
reality. This adds value to the deliberative efforts
described above.
In terms of Pellizzioni’s [17] analytic disentangle-
ment of responsibility, this may mean to add a kind of
responsibility driven by ‘before-the-event’ motifs and
‘in-order-to’ factors, the kind of responsibility he calls
care. It incorporates the sense of responsibility taken ex
ante, motivated from within (the professional role of
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nanoresearch). In contrast to responsiveness, this kind
of responsibility is not the reaction to questions or
accusations from outside, but requires an active (rather
than defensive) understanding of the role as nano-
researcher also in terms of the application and
implications of research and research activities. In
addition to the responsibilities assigned to the role
of nanoresearch by the proposition posed in
“Responsible Nanoresearch as Deliberation Across
Levels and Sectors” it suggests the necessity of an
internally initiated and personal thinking that goes
beyond action.
Thinking in this sense is not something that requires
specialised cognitive skills, Arendt argues; all it requires
is devotion and occasion, because “…the inability to
think is […] the ever-present possibility for everyone—
scientists, scholars, and other specialists in mental
enterprises not excluded.” ([2], p. 187). Even if the
possibility not to think may be tempting, there are
many individuals, researchers and others, who enter
into the inner dialogue because it is what makes them
feel responsible. Fjelland [8] interprets the story about
David Parnas, the researcher who withdrew from the
US ‘Star Wars’ initiative in 1985 and publicly criticised
the project [16], as such an example . Fjelland distils
Parnas’ sense of professional responsibility as 1) not to
rely on any external authority to make decision for
him, 2) not to ignore ethical and moral issues, and 3) to
make sure that he solves the real problem, not simply
providing short term satisfaction to his supervisors.
The responsibility to remain thinking in this sense
may sound like a heavy burden to place upon the
individual nanoresearchers, but if the institutionalisation
of deliberation and engagement in the previous section
represented a paradox, an institutionalised requirement
for contemplation may seem absurd. Still, although
thinking as such may not be installed by directives, it
may be encouraged and supported by the institutions of
research. Likewise, spaces and occasions for contem-
plation may be created and sheltered. This is what good
governance should be about, although it remains beyond
the scope of this paper to attempt to answer how to
cultivate mindfulness, increased moral sensitivity, and
thinking. We believe however that practises like the
inclusion of ethics, philosophy and ELSA-elements in
research education, as well as the generation of ‘mixed
cultures’ through broad and interdisciplinary research
programmes may provide some of the answer. Indeed,
governance as something that in effect slows down
productivity. It may lead to less favourable con-
ditions for excellent nanoresearchers and more
opportunities for social-democratic nanoresearchers,
ironic nanoresearchers and uncertainty-minded
nanoresearchers.
At the end of the day, the decision to encourage the
nanoresearchers’ occasion and motivation to act
responsible in this third way is connected to how
qualities like mindfulness is valued by the institutions
of research compared to for instance those of
efficiency and productivity. There is no way around
an evaluation of the adequacy and desirability of
contemporary science and innovation policies. Most
governments in the early 21st century see efficiency
and productivity and the fast development of science
and technology as a crucial element in the need to
maintain innovation and economic growth. There may
still be a place for inefficient mindfulness within this
kind of regime, if one also believes that there may be
significant risks and hazards in the course of S&T
development. For many critics of the innovation and
growth policies, however, these policies appear as a
result of a tragic institutional lock-in that leads to a
continued escalation of unsustainable modes of
civilization. Excluding the path of political revolutions,
one may ask what possibilities there are of change
other than that which will force itself through by severe
ecological crisis. Seen from this perspective, mindful-
ness and care is no recipe for successful change. Rather,
it is a moral imperative: It appears reckless if powerful
actors such as scientists are encouraged not to doubt
their actions or the institutional arrangements in which
they operate in what amounts to a monolithic ideology
of innovation and growth.
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